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Common Carriers Under the
Communications Act
When it enacted the Communications Act of 1934,1 Congress
borrowed the concept of common carriage from the transportation
field to describe and regulate companies providing public commu-
nications services.2 In the half-century since then, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has added to the body of
precedent interpreting the term "common carrier"3 a number of
decisions that discuss the scope of the term in the communications
context. Recently, the significance of the concept has been brought
to the fore by an FCC decision deregulating the computer en-
hancement of communication services,' and by a tentative decision
that would greatly restrict the FCC's common carrier jurisdiction. 5
Surprisingly, however, there have as yet been no comprehensive
analyses of the definition of a communications common carrier.6
This comment seeks to provide such an analysis. After reviewing
the Commission's jurisprudence in this area, the comment suggests
that an elemental approach to the definition will lead to more ef-
fective decision making in the future.
' Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
2 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940) (dictum) (commu-
nications common carriers are regulated "in analogy to the regulation of rail and other
carriers").
3 For a general discussion of the term, see L. GORTON, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON
CARRIER IN ANGLO-AmIRIcA LAW (1971).
4 Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
6 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981) (Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking).
An arguable exception is Annot., 46 A.L.R. Fed. 626 (1980). Although the discussion
there is useful, it is limited to summaries of the cases and does not employ the elemental
analysis used here. Several articles discuss whether individual services constitute common
carriage. See, e.g., Berman, CATV Leased-Access Channels and the FCC: The Intractable
Jurisdiction Question, 51 NOTRE DAm LAW. 145, 179-81 (1975); O'Riordan, An Examina-
tion of the Application of Common Carrier Regulation to Entities Providing New Telecom-
munications Services, 29 CASE W.L. Rv. 577 (1979); Shapiro, Epstein & Cass, Cable Satel-
lite Networks: Structures and Problems, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 692, 708-13 (1975); Verrill,
CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or Common Carrier?, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 586,
607-09 (1969); Comment, Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communica-
tions, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 337-40 (1967).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Significance of Common Carrier Status
The Communications Act contains two distinct schemes of
regulation:7 Title II of the Act s deals with common carriers of com-
munication services (both by wire and radio), while Title III gov-
erns the use of the radio spectrum, regardless of the nature of the
service or use.10 Classification of a firm as a common carrier vel
non may therefore be relevant under both schemes."
Title II requires common carriers to furnish service at reason-
able and nondiscriminatory rates, to file tariff schedules with the
FCC, to employ agency-prescribed accounting procedures and de-
preciation rates, to obtain FCC approval for the addition or dis-
continuance of services, to expand services if ordered to do so by
the FCC, and to submit merger and acquisition plans to the Com-
mission for approval. Thus, because of the restrictions imposed on
the use of certain radio frequencies and because of the perceived
undesirability of being subjected to the pervasive scheme of regula-
tion in Title II, the issue of who is a common carrier often arises
7 It is convenient to refer to the FCC's authority under these two schemes as its "Title
II" and "Title III" jurisdictions. A third basis of jurisdiction, the FCC's "ancillary" or "Title
I" jurisdiction, has been recognized as well. Title I, Communications Act of 1934 §§ 1-5, 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1976), contains the general provisions of the Act, including section 2(a),
47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976), which describes the FCC's jurisdiction comprehensively as "all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and ... transmission of energy by
radio." Despite the lack of substantive provisions in Title I, the courts have recognized the
power of the FCC to regulate entities that fall within the general scope of that title, even
though the entity does not fall within the more specific jurisdictions prescribed in the sub-
stantive Titles II or III. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968) (cable television). Title I jurisdiction enables the FCC to regulate such entities to the
extent necessary to effectuate the policies contained in Titles II and III. See id. at 178
(concerning Title III).
8 Communications Act of 1934 §§ 201-223, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223 (1976).
- Id. §§ 309-399.
1o Title III applies to both broadcast andnonbroadcast use of the spectrum. It empow-
ers the FCC to classify radio stations and prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered
by each such class. Id. § 303(a), (b). Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has de-
clared that certain classes of stations may be operated only on a non-common carrier basis.
47 C.F.R. § 90.415(b) (1979).
" Jurisdictions under Titles II and III are not mutually exclusive; a firm can be regu-
lated under both at the same time. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC
(NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 644-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NARUC I]. For example, radio common carriers (which offer such services as pag-
ing, dispatching, and radio telephones) are licensed under Title III and regulated under
Title II.
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when the FCC attempts to impose such a classification on an un-
willing firm.
In some instances, however, the issue arises because a firm
seeks to gain or retain common carrier classification. First, classifi-
cation as a common carrier results in incidental protection from
certain liabilities. The Copyright Act of 1976 exempts common car-
riers from liability for transmission of certain copyrighted works.12
Similarly, a common carrier enjoys a qualified immunity from lia-
bility for the transmission of a defamatory message.13 Second, an
established common carrier may find it desirable to retain the
FCC's regulation of itself or of another firm because of the eco-
nomic protection such regulation can provide. For instance, a rea-
sonable rate of return on capital is guaranteed to regulated busi-
nesses; it may be the explicit policy of the FCC to reduce
competition in that industry;14 and an established firm may find
that regulation of an industry gives it a competitive edge over po-
tential entrants because regulation creates entry barriers.1 5 Third,
a communications firm might wish to be classified as a common
carrier in order to avoid the jurisdiction of other regulatory author-
ities. For example, a nationwide common carrier might desire fed-
eral regulation because of its preemptive effect on state regula-
tion, 6 thereby ensuring at least uniformity of regulation. Finally,
because section 2(b) of the Act declares that a common carrier en-
gaged in interstate commerce solely by virtue of its physical con-
nection with another common carrier is subject to only limited reg-
ulation by the FCC, 17 a local communications firm might wish to
be classified as a common carrier in order to avoid federal
regulation.
:2 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (Supp. I 1977).
IS See O'brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 540-43 (1st Cir. 1940); Berman,
supra note 6, at 178 & n.197.
14 See, e.g., Note, The Use of Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934 to Con-
trol Shifts in Corporate Control Over Common Carriers, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 891, 901-02
(1980) (sections 221 and 222 of the Act were enacted to allow the FCC to immunize carrier
mergers from the antitrust laws). The FCC might choose to supress competition either be-
cause the field involves a natural monopoly or because competition would tend to be ruin-
ous. See text and notes at notes 47, 170-174 infra.
15 Resale & Shared Use of Common Servs. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 339 (1976)
(Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("all who labor in regulated
vineyards know ... that regulation is ... a tool by which regulated carriers protect them-
selves against competition").
" See Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 63 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
17 Communications Act of 1934 § 2(b), 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976). Section 2(b) provides
that such carriers are in large part to be regulated by the states exclusively.
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B. The Statutory Definition of Common Carriage
The Communications Act defines a common carrier as "any
person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or for-
eign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio
transmission of energy,. . . but a person engaged in radio broad-
casting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier."18 This definition has been deprecated as "circu-
lar"19 and "not meaningful."20 Its supposed inadequacies have been
used to justify reliance on the common law of common carriage.2"
Although it is proper to rely on the common law, for the legislative
history instructs that the term "common carrier" is to be applied
in its "ordinary sense, ' 22 this is no reason to ignore the statutory
definition 23 and to rely solely on the panorama of common law
precedents. Such an approach leads to inadequate analysis because
it fails to examine every element of the definition or tends to deal
with the elements in an oblique manner, thereby making it difficult
to determine whether any given element has been satisfied.
The Act's definition of common carriage should be regarded as
a valuable analytical tool, because it serves to introduce the essen-
tial elements of the concept: common; carrier; engaged in commu-
nication; for hire; but not broadcasting. A further narrowing of the
definition, not mentioned in the Act but well grounded in case
law24 and legislative history," is the exclusion of press associations
such as United Press International and Associated Press. As each
of these elements must be satisfied before a firm can be classified
as a communications common carrier, it is convenient to employ
them as an organizing scheme for a discussion of relevant FCC and
judicial precedents.
8 Id. § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
19 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.10 (1979).
20 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 54b (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
21 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 309, 363 (1979). See NARUC I, 525
F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
22 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Seass. 46 (1934).
23 The FCC's recent tentative decision proposes to do just that, however. In the Com-
mission's opinion, common carriage is not an idea "existing in nature"; accordingly, it pro-
poses to classify communication firms as common carriers when it decides that the Title II
requirements "are useful or necessary." Thus, "common carrier" would describe entities
that the FCC chooses to regulate-"no more and no less." Competitive Carrier Rulemaking,
No. 79-252, 1 54c (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
24 See text and notes at notes 113-116 infra.
25 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. 46 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d
Cong., 2d Seass. 4 (1934).
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II. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF COMMON CARRIAGE
A. Common
1. The Principles. Perhaps the most frequently recited pre-
requisite to imposing common carrier status is that the carrier
must be one that serves the public indiscriminately. It is in this
sense that a common carrier is "common," because it undertakes
to serve the public at large, holding out its services to all who may
choose to use them. A carrier whose holding out is not sufficiently
public to meet this standard is a private carrier.2 6
The size of a firm's operation is not determinative of its status
as a common carrier, nor is it relevant that its services may be
specialized and therefore of interest only to a small segment of the
public.27 Rather, the manner and terms by which companies ap-
proach and deal with customers determines this element of the
common carrier definition.2 8 Thus FCC decisions that appear in-
consistent on their face are reconcilable because of the complex na-
ture of such an inquiry. For example, the Commission has held in
two decisions that applicants are common carriers even though
each had only one customer at the time,' 9 while another decision
has viewed a service offered only to NASA to be private carriage
on the grounds that it was designed to serve the needs of only one
customer.30 The relevant difference was that in the first two cases
the carriers intended to solicit additional customers and expand
their services accordingly in the future, while, in the latter case,
the carrier intended to serve only one customer.
The FCC and the courts have not been entirely faithful to
these principles, however. In three decisions, the Commission has
relied on the specialized nature of the services offered in holding or
" See generally NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 640-43 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
(1976).
" Id. at 641-44. For example, communication services offered only to theater owners,
Theatre Television Serv., 9 Rs',. REG. (P & F) 1528, 1538 (F.C.C. 1953), members of the
stock exchanges, Western Union Tel. Co. Sicom Serv., 11 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1967), the television
broadcasting industry, Teleprompter Corp., 13 RAn. REG. (P & F) 111 (FCC Public Notice
No. 25210, 1955), and the United States Postal Service, Graphnet Syss., Inc., 73 F.C.C.2d
283, 298 (1979), have all been viewed as constituting common carriage.
- NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 641-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). "[A]
carrier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions,
in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal." Id. at 641.
29 Southern Satellite Syss., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 160 (1976); Tower Communications
Syss. Corp., 59 F.C.C.2d 130, 131 (1976).
30 National Aeronautics & Space Admin., 61 F.C.C.2d 56, 58 (1976).
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suggesting that various mobile radio services are not common car-
riage because the class of potential customers was limited to radio
licensees and because the facilities provided could be used only for
specific purposes."1 The court in National Association of Regula-
tory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC 1)"2 corrected the ap-
proach taken in these decisions when it held a new category of mo-
bile radio licensees to be private carriage. The court rejected as
rationales the possibility that the service "may be of practical use
to only a fraction of the population" or the possibility that sub-
scribers may be limited to certain radio licensees; instead, it relied
on predictions that the clientele of the new operators would be sta-
ble, that services would be provided under long-term contracts,
and that operators had reason to make highly individualized selec-
tions of customers because of concern about the compatability of
the customers' methods of operation with the overall system.33 In
applying these predictions to the entire industry, however, the
court ignored the necessarily individual nature of the inquiry by
failing to acknowledge (although the case did not force it to de-
cide) that some operators in the new service might choose to offer
services in an entirely open manner.34
A more successful application of these principles is found in a
series of decisions treating communication services as private car-
riage if they are shared on a nonprofit basis. 5 This rule employs
the reasonable presumption that such firms do not have an incen-
tive to solicit the public's business at large, and its controlling indi-
cium of private carriage is not the nature of the services but the
manner and terms of dealing with users. More importantly, the
presumption is not absolute; it will be reexamined if the carrier's
activities indicate that communication services are being held out
indiscriminately to the public.38 This approach to the holding out
element is desirable because it allows a firm to organize its affairs
so as to fall predictably inside or outside of the scope of the defini-
31 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 281, 284 (1976); Preston Trucking Co., 31
F.C.C.2d 366, 372 (1971); Multiple Licensing--Safety & Special Radio Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d
510, 519 n.2 (1970).
32 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
33 Id. at 642, 644.
34 The court did concede that its prediction of methods of operation might be mistaken.
It did so, however, by suggesting only that its prediction might prove incorrect for the in-
dustry as a whole, rather than that it might be correct as to some operators and mistaken as
to others. Id. at 644.
35 See text and notes at notes 101-104 infra.
3" AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 26-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
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tion, while it preserves sufficient flexibility for the FCC to detect
common carrier activities hiding behind a nonprofit facade.
2. Doctrinal Weaknesses. There are two important theoret-
ical concerns about the holding out criterion. The first is the
"dizzying circularity" that it creates.17 One result of assuming com-
mon carrier status is the duty to hold out services to all customers
on a nondiscriminatory basis.3 8 There is a paradox involved here,
in that the holding out is viewed as both a necessary precondition
and a necessary result of common carrier regulation.39
The second fundamental concern is whether the holding out
criterion is relevant to the imposition of common carrier status.
Generally, such a status has been associated with two distinct sets
of duties: one is strict liability for destruction of carried goods, and
the other is the obligation to provide services at reasonable
prices.40 Originally, however, the requirement of a public undertak-
ing or holding out was developed only in the context of the first set
of duties. 41 This prerequisite to common carrier status was thought
to have both procedural and substantive relevance. Procedurally,
the rules of pleading at common law focused on a defendant's un-
dertaking; substantively, it was thought that only those who held
out their services to the public at large voluntarily assumed the
higher standard of care.'2 Because one's undertaking arguably is
relevant only to the measure of tort liability, and strict liability is
not imposed on communications common carriers, the function
served by the holding out requirement in a determination whether
a communications firm should be classified as a common carrier is
37 Reply Comments of IBM Corp. at 11, Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252
(F.C.C. Apr. 4, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); see id. at 7.
" See Communications Act of 1934 § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976). See also id.
§ 201(b) (requiring that the classifications be just and reasonable).
3 As one scholar of the law of common carriage explains, this leads to circular
reasoning:
one may reach the definition that "he is a common carrier who is a common carrier,"
for he who holds himself out to the general public is a common carrier, and he who is a
common carrier must hold himself out to carry for anybody who chooses to use him.
L. GORTON, supra note 3, at 11. For an even more tautological explanation, see 1 R. HUTCH-
INSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CAP=Rs 59 (3d ed. 1906).
40 See L. GORTON, supra note 3, at 42.
41 See NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
42 See Comments of BM Corp. at 8-9, Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252
(F.C.C. Mar. 14, 1980) [hereinafter cited as IBM Comments] (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review); Comments of the National Telecommunications & Information Ad-
min. at 22, 35, Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252 (F.C.C. Mar. 14, 1980) [herein-
after cited as NTIA Comments] (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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not readily apparent. The FCC has in fact proposed to eliminate
the requirement, relying on these doctrinal weaknesses.43
These objections to the holding out requirement can be over-
come. First, this element of the definition of common carriage has
the force of congressional fiat. The legislative history of the Com-
munications Act states that the term "common carrier" is to be
applied in its "ordinary sense";," the uniform understanding then,
as now, was that "the dominant and controlling factor in determin-
ing the status of one as a common carrier is his. . . holding out."45
As a matter of statutory construction, then, the requirement of a
holding out cannot simply be discarded; rather, it must be inter-
preted in a meaningful way. This is possible despite the two con-
cerns noted above.
The circularity can be logically resolved, or at least pragmat-
ically tolerated, if the reasons for imposing both the precondition
and the resulting duty of holding out are understood. First, the
duty "to furnish . . communication service upon reasonable re-
quest"46 is necessary because of the natural monopoly enjoyed by
many common carriers, such as telephone and telegraph compa-
nies.47 If a monopolistic carrier could assume private carrier status
43 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, T% 61-62, App. B 9, 12, 41-42 (F.C.C.
Jan. 16, 1981).
44 See text and note at note 22 supra.
45 9 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 4, at 43 (1964); 9 AM. Jur. Carriers § 4, at 431 (1937); see,
e.g., The Propeller Niagara, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 22 (1858); L. GORTON, 9upra note 3, at 79,
80-81; 1 R. HUTCHINSON, supra note 39, at 44. See also 10 C.J.S. Carriers § 10, at 41 (1917).
46 Communications Act of 1934 § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
47 Cf. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 851, 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1971)
(because telephone companies have monopoly control over pole and conduit space, it is ra-
tional to require them to offer space to CATV operators). Such carriers are allowed to enjoy
monopoly status because of the natural monopoly condition that characterizes much of the
industry. For example, it would be inefficient to have two telephone lines serving the same
area where one would be sufficient. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND INSTITUTIONS 2, 34, 122, 227-28 (1971). Where such economies of scale exist, it is in
the public interest to exclude competitors. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S.
86, 93 (1953) (dictum) ("Congress may have considered the possible inconvenience to the
public of duplicate facilities-as would clearly be the case with telephones- . . . to make
more than one enterprise economically or socially undesirable") (reversing an FCC decision
to allow a second company to compete with RCA in international radio communication be-
tween certain points). See also Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 548, 548 (1969):
If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one
firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly . . . . If such a
market contains more than one firm .... [provision of services] will . . . consume
more resources than necessary ... [and therefore] produce[ ] inefficient results.
Competition is thus not a viable regulatory mechanism under conditions of natural
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by adopting a business policy of individual contracting, it would be
able to remove itself from rate regulation and charge excessive
rates. It is sensible, therefore, to require carriers that have entered
the regulated field of common carriage by a sufficient holding out
to continue to hold out their services so that the FCC may retain
its jurisdiction over them.48
A second justification for the circularity is that it serves to de-
fine the precise scope of the duty to serve. The Communications
Act imposes a duty "to furnish . . . communication service upon
reasonable request,' 4' but does not indicate what is "reasonable."
One must look to the common law: "Generally, the duty to offer
service extends as far as but no further than the company's under-
taking . . . ."5o "Reasonable," therefore, means "to the extent of
one's holding out. '5 1 This definition is sensible because it would be
unfair, under normal circumstances,52 to require a common carrier
to offer more services than it has undertaken to provide,53 or to
monopoly.
48 See Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and
Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 315 (1962) ("Once imposed, the duty to serve can not
be extinguished by the unilateral action of the utility. Under any other rule, a segment of
the public that has relied on a virtual monopoly to provide vital services could be irretriev-
ably deprived of them at the whim of the utility." (footnote omitted)).
" Communications Act of 1934 § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
8' Note, supra note 48, at 314 (footnote omitted); accord, e.g., State ex rel. Webster v.
Nebraska Tel. Co., 22 N.W. 237, 238-39 (Neb. 1885) (telephone company may not meet its
service obligation to plaintiff simply by offering him telephone service through a public tele-
phone station, because the company has undertaken to supply individual telephones to each
member of the public).
51 See Ward v. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., 300 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.) (telephone company not
allowed to refuse service to radio station that had patronized it in the past), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 820 (1962). Note that there have been few actions brought for refusal of service, so
the meaning of "reasonable" in this context is largely uncharted law.
82 The exceptional case is provided for in Communications Act of 1934 § 214(d), 47
U.S.C. § 214(d) (1976), which gives the FCC the power to require a common carrier to ex-
pand its services if the "public convenience and necessity" so demands. This power does not
undermine the analysis in text, because it is a type of duty distinctly different from the duty
to serve upon reasonable request. Procedurally, only the latter duty is enforceable through a
private action brought in the district courts, see id. §§ 206, 207, while the former duty arises
only after a formal hearing by the FCC, see id. § 214(d). Substantively, there is a marked
difference between the two: the private right is governed by a reasonableness standard while
the public right is governed by the narrower public necessity standard. It is argued here that
a carrier's holding out is relevant only to the first type of duty to serve.
" For example, a carrier may turn away business because its capacity is inadequate or
because the business is not the type normally accepted, even though the carrier is a common
carrier. NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); cf. Eastex
Tel. Coop., Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 464, 469 (1974) (a local, intrastate telephone company was
justified in serving only affluent subdivisions because it had honored all requests for service
by residents within a reasonable proximity to its trunk lines and was free under Texas law
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impose any duty to serve if the carrier has never undertaken a
public offering.
Third, the holding out requirement and the holding out re-
sponsibility are not necessarily tautological for every carrier, be-
cause the offering necessary to trigger common carrier regulation
may be different from the offering a common carrier must continue
to provide under that regulation. For example, a common carrier
may be required to expand its service into new areas to meet pub-
lic need." Similarly, an offering of services to all comers except one
racial or ethnic group would be sufficiently public to trigger a duty
to serve all comers, including the group excluded in the offering.
The strongest objection to the circularity is that the confusion
it generates may result in imposition on a firm of a duty to serve
indiscriminately before the firm ever voluntarily brings itself
within the Communications Act's common carrier jurisdiction. The
FCC and one federal court apparently have condoned such an
operation. In its Resale & Shared Use decision,5 5 the FCC, in rul-
ing that resellers of common carrier services are themselves com-
mon carriers, reasoned that they must be so because the Commis-
sion was not going to "permit resellers to operate in a
discriminatory fashion."56 Similarly, the court in NARUC I, in
holding certain mobile radio operators not to be common carriers,
observed that although "the Commission could have treated
[them] as common carriers by . . . requir[ing them] to serve all
potential customers indifferently, thus making them common car-
riers,' 57 the Commission had not done so.5 8 These decisions are
misguided. Under Title II, the FCC has authority to impose service
requirements only on a firm that is already a common carrier;59
thus it may not create a common carrier by imposing such require-
ments. This observation must be tempered if the FCC has another
basis for jurisdiction over a potential common carrier besides Title
II of the Act; in that case, it might be able to use that jurisdiction
to "force" a company to become a common carrier.60 If a proper
to choose its areas of service).
See note 52 supra.
"I Resale & Shared Use of Common Servs., 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976).
,Id. at 308.
5' NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 644 n.76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
58 Id. at 642.
59 Communications Act of 1934 §§ 201(a), 202(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 202(a) (1976).
60 For instance, if a company provides services over the airwaves, it must obtain a li-
cense to operate. The FCC could argue that it has the authority to condition the grant of
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jurisdictional basis is identified before imposition of a common
carrier duty to serve, the circularity inherent in the holding out
requirement is not fatal.
Despite some superficial appeal because the notion of "under-
taking" often arises in the context of tort liability,61 the argument
for the second fundamental concern-that a holding out may be
irrelevant to communications common carriers because they are
not saddled with the strict liability of a transportation common
carrier-is not persuasive either. First, the extent of a carrier's un-
dertaking is clearly relevant to the extent of service duties im-
posed.62 Second, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this
reasoning in another context. Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber
Co. v. Kuykendall 6s asked whether operators of logging towboats
were to be considered common carriers for purposes of a state stat-
ute that imposed rate regulation. The Court held them to be com-
mon carriers because they "held themselves out as engaged in the
business of common carriers," rejecting as irrelevant and unpersua-
sive the fact that log towers were not held to the strict liability of
common carriers.64
B. Carrier
The second element of the definition of a common carrier con-
cerns the degree of control a company must maintain over the
transmission of communications before it properly can be termed a
such a license on the company's assumption of a common carrier's status and duties. See
Communications Act of 1934 §§ 303(f), (r), 308(b), 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(f), (r), 308(b) (1976).
With regard to wire services, jurisdiction to impose common carrier duties arguably exists
because of the FCC's "ancillary" or "Title I" jurisdiction, see note 7 supra. Second Com-
puter Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 432 (1980).
61 Note that the relevance of a firm's holding out to its tort liability is subject to
dispute:
[Common carriers' duty to carry] goods upon a contract of insurance . . . [arises] not
because they hold themselves out to carry for all persons indifferently; if that were all,
there would be no ground for the policy; it would be without reason; many other per-
sons hold themselves out to act in their trade or business for all persons indifferently
who will employ them, and the policy in question is not applied to such trades . ...
Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P.D. 19, 27 (1875).
62 See text and notes at notes 49-53 supra; cf. NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.)
(the carrier's holding out is critical whether the common carrier "concept is invoked to sup-
port strict tort liability or as a justifying basis for [rate] regulation"), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
992 (1976).
63 275 U.S. 207 (1927).
Id. at 211.
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"carrier."65 At common law, the mere furnishing of the means of
transportation was not considered common carriage because, with
the customer operating the vehicle, the furnishing firm performs
no act of carriage. 6 This principle is applied by analogy in the
communications context, both by implication from the term "car-
rier" and by the express provisions of the Act. Read together, sub-
sections 3(a), (b), (d), and (h)67 say that a person must transmit
radio or wire signals to be considered a common carrier. Thus the
Commission has held that the mere offering of transmission equip-
ment is not common carriage unless the person so offering is en-
gaged in the "transmission" as well.6 8
Problems of application can arise, however, because the anal-
ogy from the transportation field is not precise. Basic telephone
service, whereby the customer operates the transmitting equip-
ment, indisputably is common carriage; this indicates that "trans-
mission" or "carriage" involves only operation and maintenance of
the lines. Where the "lines" are the airwaves and the customer
continues to operate the transmitting equipment, the concept of
transmission or carriage is stretched even further. Nevertheless, a
mobile radio telephone service, for example, can be offered on a
common carrier basis, 69 despite the entrepreneur's negligible or
nonexistent role in the actual transmission. The rationale is that
the common carrier, as the licensee of the radio channel, is respon-
sible to the FCC for supervising the channel's operation, and thus
he has control over the "line" of transmission."°
"' See 9 AM. JUR. Carriers § 31 (1937) ("It is elementary that one who performs no act
of carriage cannot be regarded as a carrier").
" See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 18 (1964).
6' Communications Act of 1934 § 3(a), (b), (d), (h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b), (d), (h)
(1976).
's See California Water & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 753, 758-59 (1977) (leasing of pole
space to cable TV operators is not common carriage because "the pole owners are not them-
selves involved in cable television transmission at all"); Multiple Licensing-Safety & Spe-
cial Radio Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d 510, 518 (1970) ("it has never been seriously contended ...
that [mobile radio] equipment suppliers ... are rendering a communications, let alone a
common carrier communications, service").
'9 See NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
7o One can discern that this is the FCC's rationale from the following cases in which the
Commission found mobile radio communication services not to be common carriage in part
because the subscribers, rather than the offerors, were the licensees of the radio channels
used. Preston Trucking Co., 31 F.C.C.2d 366, 366, 369, 372-73 (1971) (subscriber/licensee
"will have dominion and control over the radio spectrum," id. at 369); Multiple Licens-
ing-Safety & Special Radio Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d 510, 519 n.2 (1970) (distinguishing between
the private and common carrier status of mobile radio systems on the basis that, with the
latter, "the carrier is the licensee and has the ultimate legal control of the radio facilities").
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A controversial issue in this area is whether a reseller of com-
munication services is a common carrier. Typically, a reseller sub-
scribes to bulk communication services at discount rates offered by
an underlying carrier such as AT&T, and remarkets the services to
consumers at a rate set between the bulk rate and that which the
consumer would otherwise have to pay.71 The underlying carrier
continues to operate the facilities; thus the reseller is engaged in a
mere brokerage or arbitrage function.72 In other cases the reseller
might also exercise varying degrees of control over the transmis-
sion by adding additional services to the basic transmission ser-
vice. 73 In 1976, the FCC decided that all such resale activities are
common carriage.7 4 Recently, however, it reconsidered and re-
versed this position.75
There are strong arguments on both sides of this issue. The
case against regulation of resellers is based on a strict reading of
the Act, which would indicate that resellers that perform no trans-
mission functions whatsoever are not within the FCC's jurisdic-
tion.76 A reading of the legislative history initially lends support to
See also Coleman Petroleum Eng'r Co., 24 F.C.C.2d 378, 379-81 (1970).
The principle discussed here is not that bare ownership of the line of communication is
sufficient to constitute carriage, but rather that some responsibility, oversight, or control
over the line is sufficient. Thus, if AT&T were to build a complete telephone network, lines
and all, and lease it to a customer who operated it without any assistance from AT&T,
AT&T would not be involved in transmission but merely in the rental of equipment. Cf.
California Water & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 753, 758-59 (1977) (leasing of pole and conduit
space by telephone companies to cable television operators does not constitute transmission,
in part because the telephone companies have no "interest in insuring the proper transmis-
sion or delivery of the signals").
This principle, that control of the channel of communication is a prerequisite of com-
mon carriage, is also enforced even when the operator in question physically transmits the
messages. For example, a dispatch or message-answering service is not considered common
carriage unless the operator provides the facilities and is the licensee. See Multiple Licens-
ing-Safety & Special Radio Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d 510, 518 (1970). The rationale in such cases
does not turn on lack of transmission but on the conclusion that such operators are "merely
agents of the [subscriber/]licensee." Id.
71 See Resale & Shared Use of Common Servs. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 271-72
(1976).
"I Id. at 272.
73 See id. at 272-74.
1 Id. at 265.
" Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 11 120-134 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981). The
FCC's decision is based on the lack of market power, see note 88 infra, rather than the
statutory or legislative history arguments that follow.
7' The requirement of transmission is underscored by section 214, which requires carri-
ers to obtain permission before expanding their services, but only if such expansion involves
the acquisition, operation, or extension of, or transmission over, new lines. Communications
Act of 1934 § 214, 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
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this conclusion. The common carrier provisions for the most part
follow those in the Interstate Commerce Act,7 and, under that
statute, freight forwarders-who perform functions analogous to
those of resellers 8-did not come within the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")7 9 until amendments
were made in 194280 and 1950.1
On balance, though, the case for continued jurisdiction over
resellers is more persuasive. First, the Act does not decisively re-
quire common carriers to transmit. A common carrier is defined as
one who is "engaged ... in . ..communication"; 2 communica-
tion is further defined as "transmission of . . . intelligence." s A
common carrier, therefore, must merely be "engaged in transmis-
sion." Thus an entirely plausible reading of the Act, if "engaged" is
taken to mean "in the business of," is that any offering of commu-
nication services to the public constitutes one a common carrier,
even if another entity performs the actual transmission.
Second, a closer analysis of the legislative history confirms this
reading of the Act. At common law, freight forwarders were consid-
ered to be common carriers,84 and the legislative history concerning
the term "communications common carrier" can be read to refer to
that source rather than to'the Interstate Commerce Act.8 5 More-
It is noteworthy, though, that this provision has been construed quite liberally by the
FCC in the past. See generally Note, supra note 14, at 896. For example, the addition of
multiplexing equipment (which allows several signals to travel simultaneously on the same
channel by bandwidth division or time division) requires section 214 permission, Resale &
Shared Use of Common Servs. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 314 (1976), even though such
equipment merely has the effect of increasing the efficiency of existing lines or channels, see
J. MARTIN, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34 (1977).
7 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976) (superseded by 49 U.S.C. § 10102 (Supp. III 1979)); see S.
REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
7' Freight forwarders aggregate small quantities of goods and tender them for shipment
to a carrier at bulk rates. Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 968, 969-70
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 638 (1940). Their services are distinguishable, how-
ever. The freight forwarder, as compared with the pure reseller, typically collects, consoli-
dates, re-sorts, and delivers the goods, thus exercising some degree of control over the ship-
ment. Id. at 970.
79 Id. at 971-73; Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201, 303 (1938); see Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, § 203(a)(14), 49 Stat. 544 (1935) (repealed 1978). The current
version appears at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10102(8), 10561-10562 (Supp. II 1978).
'0 Act of May 16, 1942, ch. 318, 56 Stat. 284 (repealed 1978).
Act of Dec. 20, 1950, ch. 1140, 64 Stat. 1113 (repealed 1978).
82 Communications Act of 1934 § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
83 Id. § 3(a), (b), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b) (1976).
84 Ahearn, Freight Forwarders and Common Carriage, 15 FORDHAM L. REv. 248, 253-60
(1946).
85 See text and note at note 22 supra.
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over, the ICC apparently had not clarified its position on freight
forwarders until after passage of the Communications Act; 6 hence,
Congress could not have intended a reference to the ICC's subse-
quent anti-common law position.8 7
Finally, three policy considerations counsel treating resellers
as common carriers. First, lack of control over the transmission fa-
cilities does not render a firm offering communication services any
less capable of engaging in unreasonable pricing, price discrimina-
tion, or arbitrary withholding of such services. Therefore, regula-
tion of resellers is just as appropriate as regulation of underlying
carriers.88 Second, nonregulation of resellers could also shield the
underlying carrier from regulation. If a carrier were to lease all of
its capacity to one party, an unregulated reseller, it would properly
escape FCC jurisdiction because it would be a private carrier, not
8 See Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201 (1938). That decision contains
no discussion of any earlier ICC resolution of the issue.
87 An additional reason has been offered for not following the ICC's treatment of
freight forwarders: contrary to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Communications Act spe-
cifically mentions the "forwarding . . . of communications" as a common carrier activity,
Communications Act of 1934 § 3(a), (b), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b) (1976). See AT&T v. FCC,
572 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978). But this distinction does not,
standing alone, necessarily render the ICC analogy inapplicable. First, the Senate Report on
the Communications Act explains that deviations from the language of the Interstate Com-
merce Act "are made for clarification [of the terms'] application to communications, rather
than as a manifestation of Congressional intent to obtain a different objective." S. REP. No.
781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). Second, the term "forwarding" has a specialized meaning
in the transportation context, denoting the consolidation into bulk lots and re-sorting and
delivery of goods, whereas its use in the communications context clearly is intended to be in
the normal sense of the word. See Communications Act of 1934 § 3(a), (b), 47 U.S.C. §
153(a), (b) (1976) (transmission includes "the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of
communications").
"a One might argue that, to the extent resellers operate in a competitive market, they
are not capable of, nor do they have the incentive to engage in, unreasonable pricing, price
discrimination, and refusal of services because they would not enjoy monopoly power. See
Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 316-17 (1979). This argument is essen-
tially the one addressed at text and notes at notes 163-176 infra, namely, that Congress did
not intend to regulate competitive carriers of any kind. There, it is concluded that Congress
did intend to regulate competitive as well as monopolistic carriers. Thus, even if such a
policy is thought unwise from an economic standpoint, it is proper to use it as a guide to
construction of the Act because it is the policy that Congress intended. Moreover, even if
Congress did not intend to regulate competitive carriers, the policy analysis here is valid
with regard to resellers that do enjoy monopoly power-and some degree of monopoly power
is in fact likely because of the degree of service differentiation that results from the highly
individualized nature of the technical services offered by resellers, see note 89 infra. Thus
the FCC's reasoning that all resellers must be constrained by the competition from the un-
derlying carrier's tariffed rates, Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 1 129 (F.C.C.
Jan. 16, 1981), applies only where the reseller performs a simple brokerage function, and its
service thus is the same as that of the underlying carrier.
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holding out to the public. Congress could not reasonably have in-
tended to allow all parties to exempt themselves from regulation
by purposefully divorcing the transmission function from the pub-
lic marketing function. Third, those resellers that enhance the un-
derlying service can be viewed as exercising sufficient control over
the transmission to warrant treatment as carriers and thus should
be regulated.89
C. Engaged in Communication
Generally speaking, to come within the FCC's common carrier
jurisdiction, a firm must offer a communication service; 90 that is, it
must transmit messages of some sort.9 1 This observation, vacuous
as it may sound, has caused the Commission some difficulty in the
past. The Western Union Company at one time offered such ser-
vices as flowers and gifts by wire, candygrams, cigargrams, and
even dollygrams, and still offers a money order service. In such ser-
vices, a communication function-the sending of the message by
telegraph to the delivery office-is combined with a merchandising
function-the sale and delivery of the flowers, dolls, and so forth.
The Commission correctly ruled that the former was common car-
riage but the latter was not.9 2 Although there is an information
content in the mere delivery of the flowers and dolls, that message
is not communicated by "wire or radio" and thus is not the type of
communication governed by the Act.93
"' "[M]any resellers . . . utilize switches . . . to perform alternate routing, queuing,
timing, billing, authorization code and other functions ... [and] are thus directly involved
with the transmission pipeline." Reply Comments of AT&T at 49, Competitive Carrier
Rulemaking, No. 79-252 (F.C.C. April 4, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review).
90 See Public Notice No. 1694, at 2-3, (F.C.C. Nov. 5, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Public
Notice] (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
91 See Communications Act of 1934 § 3(a), (b), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b) (1976) ("Commu-
nication ... means transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds").
92 See Public Notice, supra note 90; Activities of Regulatory and Enforcement Agen-
cies Relating to Small Business: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 6 of the House Select
Comm. on Small Business, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1966) (testimony of E. William
Henry).
Western Union's money order service was not detariffed until 1979. See Western Union
Tel. Co., Statement Describing Services Not Covered by Tariffs (Mar. 8, 1979) (on file with
The University of Chicago Law Review).
The delivery of flowers and other products would not properly be treated as an inciden-
tal service within the meaning of the statute, because such service does not involve the
"receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications," Communications Act of 1934 § 3(a),
(b), 47 U.S.C. § 153(a), (b) (1976) (emphasis added).
" The reason the sending of the telegraph message is regulated despite being incidental
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When messages are transmitted by wire or radio, however, the
information content can be quite rudimentary and still come
within the FCC's jurisdiction. For example, a paging service may
be conducted on a common carrier basis94 even though the intelli-
gence transmitted is only a "beep" signifying that the recipient
should call a prearranged number. LikeWise, cable television sys-
tems constructed with two-way capacity enabling the home viewer
to respond to questions95 involve common carriage."" Finally, the
requirement of even a rudimentary information content disappears
when transmission occurs by radio rather than by wire. Any person
engaged in "transmission of energy by radio" can be a common
carrier if the other elements of the definition are met.9 7 For exam-
ple, a company that held itself out for hire to beam solar energy to
earth by microwave would be defined as a common carrier even
though no communication is involved.
D. For Hire
This element of the definition is well grounded in common
law. A common carrier must be an entrepreneur;98 gratuitous ser-
vices are not regulated.9 9 Compensation may be implicit, however.
For example, if a third party, the parent corporation of the carrier,
charges for the services of the carrier, compensation to the carrier
in the form of stock dividends will render the service "for hire."00
Because a firm does not have to operate at a profit to be mak-
ing an offering "for hire," the compensation element has arisen in
FCC decisions to date only in the context of holding out. As dis-
cussed above,101 the Commission has taken the position in certain
cases that if a carrier operates on a nonprofit basis, this is a suffi-
cient indication of an intent not to hold one's services out to all
potential users, so that the entity will be considered a private car-
to the sale of the flowers or candy is discussed in text at notes 139-141 infra.
4 See Xerox Corp., 74 F.C.C.2d 471, 482 (1979).
See Chi. Tribune, May 27, 1980, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
'6National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 610
nn.44-46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (opinion of Wilkey, J.) [hereinafter cited as NARUC II].
'" Communications Act of 1934 § 3(d), (h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(d), (h) (1976) (emphasis
added).
1 13 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 3 (1964).
" Communications Act of 1934 § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
100 Cf. Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
997 (1967) (a transportation case).
10! See text and note at note 35 supra.
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
rier. l °2 Sharing of communication facilities on a nonprofit basis is
therefore generally not common carriage,10 3 not because it is not
done for hire, but because it is not a public offering. If an indis-
criminate offering to the public is in fact being made, a firm will
be considered a common carrier despite its nonprofit status. 0 4
This sensible distinction renders the holding out element more
predictable.
E. Not Broadcasting
"A person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be
deemed a common carrier.' 0 5 This relatively uncontroversial ele-
ment of the definition is grounded in two policy concerns. 0 The
first is that Congress feared that excessive regulation would inhibit
development and utilization of the radio spectrum and would crip-
ple a still-young industry.10 7 The second is the concern that exces-
sive regulation, particularly the duty to serve indiscriminately,
might supress the journalistic freedom that broadcasters were in-
tended to enjoy.108 The latter rationale has been stressed in recent
years. For example, in its 1979 decision FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp.,0 9 the Supreme Court held that the FCC could not impose
102 See AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
103 Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 316
(1976). Nonprofit operations were also relied upon to find non-common carriage in Special
Emergency Radio Serv., 24 F.C.C.2d 310, 314 (1970).
10 See AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 26-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
105 Communications Act of 1934 § 3(h), 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976). Television broadcast-
ing is encompassed in "radio broadcasting." Id. § 3(b), (o), 47 U.S.C. § 153(b), (o) (1976).
Broadcasting is the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by
the public. Id. § 3(o), 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976). Thus, radio transmission intended only for
a limited or private audience, such as paging, may constitute common carriage. Although
the Commission has not squarely addressed the issue, its position apparently is that compa-
nies that simply transmit television programs to the public as a service for acknowledged
broadcasters are themselves not broadcasters. See Matrock Corp., 73 F.C.C.2d 802, 803 &
n.5 (1979) (dictum) (distribution of programs to pay television subscribers is common car-
riage). It is not clear whether this position is based on the theory that such carriers do not
"intend" reception by the public, or on the theory that such carriers do not "disseminate"
because they transmit only on behalf of the broadcaster, rather than on their own behalf.
The latter rationale is the more plausible, although both would convert an ordinary word
into a term of art.
206 A third rationale, that Congress chose not to impose Title II regulation on broad-
casters because the industry is not subject to natural monopoly conditions, is mentioned in
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-76 (1940).
107 See Note, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 962, 981-82.
108 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105-110 (1973) (broadcasters are
not under a duty to serve all advertisers).
10' 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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on cable television operators the common carrier obligation of of-
fering channel capacity for others' transmissions because that in-
dustry is sufficiently similar to broadcasting to invoke the policy
contained in the Act's exclusion of broadcasters from common
carriage. 1 0
F. The Press Association Principle: Primarily a Noncommunica-
tion Service
1. The Principle. The legislative history of the Act makes
clear that a press association such as UPI and AP is not to be con-
sidered a common carrier.111 The congressional reports do not indi-
cate why this is so, however,""' and one might readily conclude that
the distribution of communications in the form of press releases
for hire would be common carriage. An examination of the histori-
cal application of "common carrier" resolves this issue. At common
law, a person who carries goods to which he has title is not a com-
mon carrier.11 3 Rather, he is viewed as a merchandiser of the goods
carried. Although a transportation service is implicitly included in
the purchase price of goods to be delivered, it is viewed as a mere
incident to the primary activity, the sale of the goods.11 4 This pre-
cedent applies to press associations by analogy. By virtue of the
labor invested, press associations have been viewed as having cer-
tain property rights in the stories they research and write.115 Thus,
although part of UPI's and AP's subscription rate applies to the
service of transmitting the information to subscribers, such charges
are properly not tariffed because they are merely incidental to the
sale of the news. On the other hand, the telephone and telegraph
companies that transmit the news stories for UPI and AP are
110 Id. at 702-08.
"I H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934); H.R. RP. No. 1850, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934).
1'2 The House reports, see note 111 supra, might be read as reasoning that press as-
sociations are not common carriers because they tend to individualize their services. When
they are read in light of the circularity inherent in the definition, however, it is clear that
Congress meant that press associations are allowed to individualize their offerings because
they are not common carriers.
"' See The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 559-61 (1914); cf. New Hampshire Pub.
Utils. Comm'n v. Naughton, 394 A.2d 311, 312-13 (N.H. 1978) (trash collectors are not com-
mon carriers because title in the trash is impliedly transferred to the collector).
"' See Lloyd McKee Motor, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 539,
542, 602 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1979).
"' See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
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treated as common carriers 118 because they have no interest in the
intelligence transmitted.
2. Cable Television. This analysis explains another major
FCC common carrier precedent. In its Frontier Broadcasting Co.
decision, 111 the Commission ruled that cable television operators,
which resemble common carriers in that they transmit television
signals for hire, are not common carriers. 118 Its rationale was that
whereas common carriers transmit intelligence of a customer's de-
sign and choosing, cable operators receive and distribute signals
determined by the operator rather than the subscriber.1 This de-
cision has been interpreted as establishing a principle unique to
the communications field.120 Such an interpretation is incorrect,
because a regulatory agency has no authority to tamper with its
statutory directive by adding or subtracting provisions.121 Rather,
the FCC's decision reflects a proper application of the common law
press association principle referred to in the Act's legislative his-
tory. 1 22 Cable operators can be viewed as having a property interest
in the programs they transmit to their subscribers because the
operators select the programs and pay royalties for their trans-
mission,1 23 and some cable operators even produce and distribute
their own programs.1 24 To the extent that cable operators do not
engage in such activities, however, their services might properly be
See Subscription Television Serv., 3 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1966).
,' 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
'i8 Id. at 253-55. Note that the statutory broadcaster exclusion does not apply to cable
operators because the FCC has determined that they are not engaged in broadcasting,
CATV & TV Repeater Servs., 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959).
2'1 24 F.C.C. at 253-55.
See NARUC II, 533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
121 Cf. NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 644 (D.C. Cir.) ("The common law definition of com-
mon carrier is sufficiently definite as not to admit of agency discretion in the classification of
operating communications entities"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
' Cf. Letter to J.E. Belknap & Assocs., 43 F.C.C. 1562, 1562-63 (1953) (suggesting that
a microwave distributor of television signals is either a "common carrier of communications"
or a "vendor of program materials" according to whether the distributor has any "property
rights" in the signal).
M23 The copyright royalty payment provision for cable operators is found at 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(d)(2) (Supp. I1 1979). But see Western Union Tel. Co., 14 F.C.C. 1026, 1028-29
(1950) (holding that a service whereby Western Union furnishes news reports of sports
events is common carriage despite payment by Western Union to the baseball clubs for the
right to disseminate the information; the Commission reasoned that, according to the terms
of the contract with the clubs, Western Union acquired no property rights in the news).
"' For the same reasons, broadcasters are not common carriers in delivering their pro-
grams. This rationale would not apply to the service of selling air time to advertisers, how-
ever, see text and note at note 125 infra, and thus the statutory exemption discussed in text
at notes 105-109 supra is needed to preclude common carrier regulation entirely.
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considered common carriage. For example, if a cable operator were
merely a conduit for the distribution of programs by a third party,
it would be engaged in common carriage. 125
3. Basic Versus Enhanced Services. A third application of
this principle can be seen in the Commission's Final Decision in its
Second Computer Inquiry rulemaking. 126 In that case the FCC ad-
dressed the problem of how to regulate the myriad of computer-
related services that have been introduced into the telecommunica-
tions industry over the past two decades. 127 It decided to continue
regulating "basic" communication services but to treat "enhanced"
services as non-common carriage. 12  Basic services are those that
affect the subscriber's message only to the extent necessary to fa-
cilitate transmission of the message. 2 " Enhanced services are those
that "employ computer processing applications that act on the for-
mat, content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, differ-
ent, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction
with stored information."1s
This decision to treat enhanced communication services as
non-common carriage arguably falls under the press association
25 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-02 (1979).
The intriguing issue of whether a cable system falls under the Frontier Broadcasting
precedent if it is organized such that the cable operator transmits only those programs or
stations that a majority of his subscribers request (as determined by a vote), was presented
in CATV & TV Repeater Servs., 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959). The Commission held such an opera-
tor not to be a common carrier because the minority of subscribers still have no choice. Id.
at 428. This reasoning is not persuasive. Because the cable operator exerts no control over
the content of this transmission, and has to pay no royalites, see 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3)
(Supp. III 1979), he has no property interest in the transmission. Furthermore, the primary
service becomes one of transmitting to the subscriber, for a fee, those signals he wishes to
see. This is a simple communication service rather than a programming service. In such a
situation, the cable operator's role is the same as that of the telephone or telegraph com-
pany in its relationship to UPI, except that the subscriber, rather than the sender of the
communication, pays the bill.
126 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
1" The Second Computer Inquiry decision represents the latest attempt by the FCC to
solve a problem with which it has struggled for 10 years. Prior attempts include the Tenta-
tive and Final Decisions in its First Computer Inquiry, Computer Use of Communications
& Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (Tentative Decision); 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Final
Decision), aff'd in part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), and
the Tentative Decision in the Second Computer Inquiry, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1978). For a
description of these services, see J. MARTIN, supra note 76.
128 77 F.C.C.2d at 387. The attempt to distinguish between data processing and commu-
nications was abandoned. Id. at 390, 428.
129 Id. at 419-21.
3 45 Fed. Reg. 31,319, 31,364-65 (1980) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)).
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principle. If the carrier alters the content of the information trans-
mitted, or provides additional or different information, it either is
exercising control over the communication analogous to that exer-
cised by cable operators, or it has a property interest in the con-
tent analogous to that of the wire services." 1 In such cases, it is
probable that the consumer is seeking the enhancement service
and that the transmission is a mere incident to that service.23 2
Likewise, when the enhancement does not alter content but pro-
vides services not involving communication, such as allowing a sub-
scriber to store and retrieve information, the primary service might
well be the noncommunication one. The decision in the Second
Computer Inquiry can be faulted, however, for making this pre-
sumption of primacy too sweeping. The Commission has aban-
doned its former position whereby mixed communication and com-
puter services were examined to determine which predominated.133
Although this may have proven administratively burdensome, 34
such a burden is perhaps necessary due to the large variety of en-
hanced services that exist. Moreover, the present approach appar-
ently would allow the provider of a service that is primarily com-
munication to avoid regulation by adding a minor enhanced service
that is irrelevant to the consumer. Additionally, even if a commu-
nication service is truly incidental to a computer service, and thus
is not regulated according to the precedents analyzed so far, there
is a modification of this principle, discussed below,3 5 holding that
if the communication and computer services are offered by a firm
otherwise engaged in common carriage, the communication service
will be regulated despite its incidental character.
4. Recapitulation. Three examples of the common law prin-
ciple that a carrier of his own goods is not a common carrier have
been provided: press associations, cable television, and computer
enhancement services. They demonstrate a progressive weakening
of the notion that the carrier has a property right in the thing car-
ried; this progression culminates in the example of a storage and
retrieval service where it becomes implausible to assert such an in-
terest. This problem does not arise from application of the trans-
portation analogy; rather, it shows that the press association prin-
"I See 77 F.C.C.2d at 430.
132 See id. at 435.
133 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(5) (1979) (current version at 45 Fed. Reg. 31,319, 31,364
(1980)).
134 See 77 F.C.C.2d at 430.
135 See text and notes at notes 139-141 infra.
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ciple is based on the broader reasoning that a communication
service incidental to a noncommunication service is not common
carriage. A property interest in the information transmitted there-
fore is not necessary to invoke the principle.13 6 What is essential is
that the actions establishing dominion or control over the content
of the information constitute the service in which the customer is
primarily interested. Because the primacy of the noncommunica-
tion service is the heart of the principle, the principle is properly
applied to cases such as information and retrieval services that in-
volve no carrier control over the message content.13 7
Problems of application can arise in determining the inciden-
tal nature of the communication service. First, the nature of the
primary service must be kept clearly in view in order to determine
whether it is indeed a noncommunication service, for an advocate
might attempt to avoid regulation by calling a common carrier ac-
tivity an enhanced service.138 The second problem arises when a
firm that is primarily a common carrier undertakes noncommuni-
cation services involving incidental communication services. It is
clear that common carriers may engage in non-common carrier ac-
tivities without those services being subject to regulation.13 9 At
first glance, the press association principle suggests that the inci-
dental communication services should also remain free from regu-
lation. The FCC, however, has taken the position that the tele-
graph charges incidental to Western Union's flowers-by-wire,
candygram, and gifts-by-wire services are to be tariffed. " ° This
modification of the press association principle is consistent with its
136 Thus the decision in Western Union Tel. Co., 14 F.C.C. 1026 (1950), is incorrect to
the extent that it suggests that a firm can retain common carrier status by contracting away
the property rights in the information transmitted before transmission, see note 123 supra.
The decision is correct, however, on the grounds discussed in text at notes 139-141 infra,
namely, that the offeror was already regulated as a common carrier. See note 140 infra.
" Similarly, a news wire service is not common carriage because the primary service is
the collection and writing of the news stories; cable service is not common carriage because
it is primarily an entertainment service-the selection and packaging of programs.
"3 For example, a company might be the lessor of radio devices, operated on frequen-
cies licensed to that company, to be used in a geological survey. See Industrial Radioloca-
tion Serv., 5 F.C.C.2d 197 (1966). It could be argued that the provision of such a service is
non-common carriage because providing the radio equipment and licensing the frequency is
incidental to an engineering service. See id. at 201 (position not adopted by FCC). The
engineering service itself, however, involves the transmission of energy and thus is a com-
mon carrier activity. See text and note at note 98 supra.
M See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979).
1' See text and note at note 92 supra. The FCC has also regulated Western Union's
sports news service. See notes 123, 136 supra. In neither case, however, did the FCC employ
the reasoning advanced here.
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rationale because it would be more troublesome to isolate and
detariff such charges than it would be to continue regulation.
Moreover, this exception to the general rule prevents established
carriers from attempting to avoid regulation by adding noncom-
munication services across the board and claiming that they are
the primary ones. On the other hand, a flowers-by-wire service of-
fered by the Florists Transworld Delivery Association, a non-com-
mon carrier, is entirely unregulated even though the service is es-
sentially identical to that offered by Western Union.14
5. Misapplication. This comment has discussed only the con-
sistent applications of the press association principle thus far. In
fact, there has been general misunderstanding of this principle,
primarily reflected in the misconstruction of the cable television
precedent. As discussed above, the proper basis of that decision is
that the cable operator, by choosing and packaging the signals, is
offering primarily an entertainment service. 142 The FCC, however,
has viewed the decision as establishing the principle that lack of
substantial customer control over the intelligence transmitted ren-
ders a service non-common carriage.143
Such a principle is inappropriate for several reasons. First, as
previously mentioned, the principle would be sui generis to com-
munications if it were adopted, and thus beyond the common law
guidelines that Congress has mandated for the construction of the
term "common carrier."'14 4 Second, it is inconsistent with other
precedents. For example, in a letter to the Florists' Telegraph De-
livery Service, the Commission expressed the view that the trans-
mission of messages to accompany the gift of flowers "might well
141 See text and note at note 145 infra. The charge for flowers is not tariffed in either
case, however. See text and notes at notes 90-97 supra.
141 See text and notes at notes 117-119 supra.
'43 See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 367 (1979). For example, the
Commission held in Industrial Radiolocation Serv., 5 F.C.C.2d 197 (1966), that a company
that leased geological exploration radar equipment to customers, operating on frequencies
licensed to that company, was not a common carrier because "the radio facilities ... cannot
... be used to transmit any intelligence of the design and choice of the customer." Id. at
202. The Commission did go on to conclude that "the specific intelligence transmitted is and
must be the sole responsibility and prerogative of the licensee." Id. There seems to be no
basis for this assertion, however, other than the licensee's statutory duty to limit the use of
the allocated spectrum to permissible purposes. Yet such a duty exists in all radio licensee
cases, and if it were sufficient to invoke the Frontier Broadcasting precedent, there would
be no such thing as a radio common carrier. Rather, it is the geological formations at which
the radio equipment is aimed that determine the content of the transmission, not the licen-
see or the subscriber.
144 See text and notes at notes 120-121 supra.
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be" common carriage, irrespective of "whether such messages were
chosen from fixed texts or prepared by the sender. ' 145 Another
contrary example is paging, which is viewed as common carriage
even though the subscriber's choice is limited to only one mes-
sage-a beep.148 Finally, misconstruction of the cable precedent
can create difficulties in reaching the correct result in certain cases.
For instance, as the capacity of cable systems increases to dozens
of channels, 47 it becomes unconvincing to argue, as the FCC ap-
parently would, that a subscriber has no significant control over
the content of the communications he pays to receive. Yet if the
cable operator's control, rather than the viewer's lack of control, is
the focus of the inquiry, such a case is easy: the operation would
continue to be non-common carriage because the cable operator, in
performing the same services as before, continues to offer primarily
an entertainment service, only now the service involves a larger
number of programs. 48
III. A NEW ELEMENT: MARKET POWER
The FCC has tentatively decided that "communication suppli-
ers without market power need not be treated as common carri-
ers"; 1 49 this would make power over price a jurisdictional prerequi-
site. The Commission used the following argument in favor of this
additional element in the definition of common carrier. In the En-
glish common law development of common carrier status, common
carriage was seen as one instance of the large class of professions
known as "public callings." Possession of a monopoly was a neces-
sary characteristic of being engaged in a public calling. American
courts concurred because a monopolistic position was considered
1,6 Public Notice No. 1630 (F.C.C. Dec. 6, 1951) (on file with The University of Chicago
Law Review). Similarly, a Western Union service, the Melodygram, whereby the customer
could order any one of 10 prerecorded discs containing a song, was tariffed at one time. See
Melodygram Serv., F.C.C. Tariff No. 250, at 3 (Sept. 1966) (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review).
16 See text and note at note 94 supra. If the principle of customer control were applied
to "collect" telegrams and telephone calls, which have consistently been considered common
carrier services, these activities would necessarily be beyond the FCC's jurisdiction because
the party paying for the services does not determine the content of the incoming message.
4' See J. MARTIn, supra note 76, at 135-41.
148 A department store that delivers its own goods is no more a common carrier than is
a grain merchant who delivers his, despite the greater choice the consumer has in the nature
of the goods transported.
"' Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 8 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981); see id. 1 56
& n.43.
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constitutionally necessary to subject businesses to pervasive entry,
exit, and rate regulation of the type imposed by the Communica-
tions Act. Finally, Congress's intent was to regulate only carriers
with market power because in 1934 when the Act was passed com-
mon carriers were monopolistic, and because the purpose underly-
ing the scheme of regulation in Title II was to prevent monopolis-
tic abuses. 150 This argument is both analytically and factually
defective, however.
First, the reading of English common law is erroneous. Ed-
ward Adler, in a comprehensive and discerning analysis, explains
that "[n]owhere is monopoly suggested as the distinguishing char-
acteristic" between private and common carriers, nor did "com-
mon" mean monopolistic; 151 rather, "the word 'common' describes
the nature of the undertaking" and could be applied to any busi-
ness whatsoever if conducted in a public, as opposed to a private,
manner.15 2 As between public and private callings generally,
"[m]onopoly. . . cannot be accepted [as the distinguishing factor]
... either at present or in the distant past," because innkeepers,
smiths, farriers, and tailors, considered to be people engaged in
public callings, were no less numerous than butchers, carpenters,
and weavers, Who were not so considered. 153
In American law, the monopolistic character of rate-regulated
industries was viewed for only a very short time as the essential
feature sustaining the constitutionality of such regulation.1 The
Supreme Court used language to this effect in 1876155 and again in
1892.156 In 1894, however, the Court affirmed North Dakota's regu-
150 Id. 1 11-53, App. B.
"' Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARv. L. REv. 135, 156 (1914).
152 Id. at 152. See generally id. at 149-56.
153 Id. at 149. An argument contrary to that made by Adler is presented by Wyman,
The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution to the Trust Problem (pts. 1-2), 17 HARv. L.
REV. 156, 217 (1903-04): "Upon the whole the circumstances surrounding these [surveyed]
cases suggest this as the characterizing thing; that in the private calling the situation is that
of virtual competition, while in the public calling the situation is that of virtual monopoly."
Id. at 161.
Adler has the better argument. As Wyman himself observes, no explicit reliance on
monopolistic status is made in the cases; he can only say that "circumstances ... suggest"
this as the critical factor. Even then, the circumstances were not consistently monopolistic.
1 Even to the extent that it was so considered, this does not support the proposition
that monopoly was considered a necessary element of the definition of common carrier. See
text and notes at notes 161-162 infra.
13 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In that case, the Court upheld an Illinois law
regulating grain elevators, mentioning during a general description of the business that it
"may be a 'virtual' monopoly." Id. at 131.
I" In Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892), the Court viewed monopolistic status as
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lation of grain elevators where conditions were highly competi-
tive,157 and twice thereafter, in 191418 and 1934,159 the Court ex-
pressly rejected monopoly conditions as a controlling rationale. 160
The analytical defect in reliance on early English and Ameri-
can law is that it confuses the purpose of regulation with the
description of the class of businesses regulated. In other words,
even if common carriers were not regulated unless they were also
monopolies, this does not mean that a company had to be monopo-
listic to be described as a common carrier. "Common carrier" is a
discrete concept, separate from either "monopoly" or "public call-
ing."''l Thus even if monopoly is a necessary element of a public
calling, this shows only that common carriers were first regulated
because they were typically monopolies.16 2 Congress, however, has
imposed regulation on all common carriers regardless of their mo-
nopolistic status.
Second, although the strong market positions of the telephone
and telegraph companies constituted the principal reason for the
enactment of Title II's scheme of regulation,6 s Congress was aware
that competitive conditions existed in certain parts of the industry
circumscribed by its use of the term "common carrier." The ex-
isting telegraph systems were viewed as "fully" and "highly com-
petitive" and "substantially all points reached by. . .all the major
competitors in the wireless field" experienced competitive condi-
tions.' 6 4 An additional indication that Congress did not consider
the term common carrier necessarily limited to firms with market
being the decisive factor determining the quasi-public character of the business. Id. at 545.
157 Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 402-03 (1894).
I" German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 410 (1914).
159 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534-35 (1934).
160 See generally McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest,
43 HARv. L. REv. 759, 767-72 (1930).
161 See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, App. B 1 43 (F.C.C. Jan. 16,
1981); NTIA Comments, supra note 42, at 14 ("The law on public callings was... applic-
able to common carriers because ... monopoly conditions existed in transportation").
16' Nowhere does the FCC cite an instance where firms within an industry were classi-
fied as common carriers vel non on the basis of monopoly power. Rather, particular occupa-
tions were classified as public callings in part because monopoly conditions predominated,
one such occupation being that of common carriage. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking,
No. 79-252, App. B 11 5-17, 37-46 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
163 See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). See also Competitive Carrier
Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 6 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
164 H.R. REP. No. 1273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 90, 961, 998 (1934). Other comments on
competitive conditions appear elsewhere in the legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 1850,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (directing the FCC to investigate the effect of exclusive con-
tracts for telegraph offices on "other competing carriers").
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power is that, one year after the enactment of the Communications
Act, it passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,165 using "common
carrier" to regulate "relatively competitive carrying industries. '" 16e
Finally, policy considerations disfavor complete deregulation
of competitive carriers. The scheme of entry, exit, and rate regula-
tion found in Title II is designed to do more than prevent monopo-
listic abuse. 167 A firm might discriminate in rates or refuse services
for noneconomic reasons, practices that sections 201 and 202 spe-
cifically prohibit.168 Without the section 214(d) power to compel
extension of service,16 9 less profitable areas might be deprived of
needed communications capacity. The control of firm entry 70 is
needed where it is desirable to preserve monopolistic conditions in
certain markets; for example, if start-up costs are high,1 71 a period
of guaranteed reduced competition might be necessary to induce
development of a new technology.17 2 Moreover, competitive condi-
tions may bring with them destructive side effects. Problems of in-
compatible equipment or resistance to carrier-to-carrier intercon-
nection may arise,17 s and competition in the form of quality and
-6- Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (repealed 1978).
166 NARUC I, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
167 See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 47, at 11 (economic justifications for the institution of
regulated monopoly include the control of important industries, the protection of the con-
suming public, and the recognition of economies of scale and ineffective competition).
It should be noted that although Title II is designed to correct the harmful practices
that can occur in a competitive market, the FCC might be able to correct some or all of
these practices without Title II jurisdiction through its "ancillary or Title I" jurisdiction.
See text and notes at notes 7, 60 supra. Cf. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(a), 76.61(a) (1979) (imposing
a limited common carrier duty on cable television operators to carry the television signals of
stations that are in the same region as the cable company).
166 Communications Act of 1934 §§ 201-202, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (1976).
169 Id. § 214(d).
170 See id. § 214(a).
171 Such is the case, for example, with satellite systems because of the high initial
launching and equipment costs. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 320
(1979).
172 Cf. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 47, at 173:
The major prerequisites [of destructive competition] are fixed or sunk costs that
bulk large as a percentage of total costs; and long-sustained and recurrent periods of
excess capacity. These two circumstances describe a condition in which. . . the possi-
bility arises that the industry as a whole, or at least the majority of its firms, may find
themselves operating at a loss for extended periods of time.
Similarly, a sustained monopoly may be beneficial where an industry exhibits natural mo-
nopoly characteristics. See text and note at note 47 supra.
173 See Ferris, Common Carrier Regulation for the Future, 17 HARv. J. LEGIS. 241, 246-
47 (1980) (competition has created new regulatory problems such as "incompatible terminal
equipment which would harm the overall telephone network," and requires regulation to
achieve "carrier-to-carrier interconnection on equitable terms") (Mr. Ferris is Chairman of
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capacity cutting or quality upgrading may lead to unreliable ser-
vice or unnecessary extras.17 4 Because of such problems, it is un-
wise to pose a "once-and-for-all choice between competition and
regulation, since either system is subject to imperfections of vary-
ing intensity and mischievousness. ' 175 The preferable course is the
one that the Commission has recently set: de minimis regulation of
competitive carriers,176 preserving common carrier jurisdiction to
correct destructive practices whenever necessary. Even if the ex-
isting scheme of regulation is inappropriate in today's communica-
tions market, because of its much more competitive climate, whole-
sale revision of the Act is more appropriately undertaken by
Congress than by the Commission.7
CONCLUSION
In its details, the FCC's application of the term "common
carrier" reflects a moderately successful jurisprudence. The basic
common law elements of the term have been preserved-namely, a
holding out of services for hire to the public at large, a certain de-
gree of control over the transmission of the message, a refusal of
jurisdiction when the transmission is incidental to a noncommuni-
cation service, and, so far, inclusion of both monopolistic and com-
petitive firms. The elements unique to communications have been
preserved as well-namely, at least a rudimentary intelligence con-
tent and an exclusion of broadcasters. Yet there have been faults.
There has been no clear understanding of the proper theory be-
hind the cable and press association precedents, and there is a gen-
eral tendency to adopt one rule for a particular technology and to
apply it without considering variances in the operation of an in-
the FCC). Communications Act of 1934 § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1976), for example, requires
common carriers to "establish physical connections with other carriers."
174 See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 47, at 6, 10.
7 Id. at 34. See also Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252 (F.C.C. Jan. 16,
1981) (Fogarty, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the FCC's proposal
"would put the Commission in an analytic straightjacket and would be totally at odds with
[the] ...need for flexibility and discretion").
176 Before proposing its more radical form of deregulation, the Commission adopted its
proposal in the Competitive Carrier Rulemaking to "deregulate so far as possible" competi-
tive carriers, 77 F.C.C.2d at 310-11, by presuming market prices to be fair and by eliminat-
ing or reducing filing and reporting requirements. 40 Fed. Reg. 76,148 (1980) (to be codified
in 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.38, .39, .58, 63.07, .71).
177 Indeed, two bills pending in the last Congress would have effected such a revision
period. See H.R. 6121, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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dividual firm. 8 In addition, a broader view of the FCC's common
carrier jurisprudence reveals a general tendency to look for the
quintessential characteristic of common carriage. 179 This reductive
approach fails to recognize that there are several discrete elements
in the definition, and that, if the definition is properly applied, the
whole is not greater than the sum of its parts.
The Commission has recently proposed the abandonment of
its entire body of common carrier precedent.8 0 It views the Act's
definition of common carriage as meaningless, and it intends to as-
sert or withhold its Title II jurisdiction solely on the basis of what
it perceives to be the policies served by that portion of the Act.,8,
Far from being devoid of content, however, the Act's definition re-
fers to the rich common law of common carriage, and further re-
fines the term for use in the communications context. It is true
that the dynamic nature of the telecommunications field produces
difficulties in applying the term common carrier, but organization
and analysis of FCC common carrier law according to the separate
conceptual components of the term should provide a strong theo-
retical basis for future construction.
Mark A. Hall
178 "Historically, we have . . . confined our decisions to the nature of services pro-
vided.... Thus, once having identified a particular service as a 'common carrier communi-
cations' service, we have not previously sought to distinguish among the providers of that
service." Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252, 54 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
179 Even where several elements of the definition have been examined in FCC decisions,
they have been treated in an imprecise fashion. For example, in its Second Computer In-
quiry decision, the Commission presented arguments for treating enhanced communication
services as non-common carriage that touched on at least four of the elements discussed
here, but did so obliquely without clearly resolving whether absence of any single element
was sufficient for its holding. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 430 (1980)
(press association principle); id. at 430, 431-32 (providers of nontraditional services are not
common carriers in the "ordinary sense" of the term); id. at 435 (lack of monopoly control);
id. (noncommunication elements).
Similarly, the specialized nature of the service offered, the lack of carrier control over
the transmission, and the incidental nature of services are all mentioned in Multiple Licens-
ing-Safety & Special Radio Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d 510, 519 n.2 (1970).
180 Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, No. 79-252 (F.C.C. Jan. 16, 1981).
181 Id. 54e; see note 23 supra. The Commission relies on an agency's prerogative to
construe ambiguous statutory terms, and argues that the best guide for construction is con-
gressional purpose and intent. The flaw in this reasoning is that although the dominant
legislative policy should guide the interpretation of a term in cases of true ambiguity, and
thus should serve to define its contours, this methodology should not be used to eschew the
essential meaning of the term.
